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Abdelgawad, M and Fayek, A R (2011) Fuzzy Reliability Analyzer: Quantitative Assessment of Risk Events in the Construction Industry Using Fuzzy Fault-Tree Analysis. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(04), 294–302.
Barraza, G A (2011) Probabilistic Estimation and Allocation of Project Time Contingency. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(04), 259–65.
Chua, D K H and Yeoh, K W (2011) PDM++: Planning Framework from a Construction Requirements Perspective. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(04), 266–74.
Kim, H and Reinschmidt, K F (2011) Effects of Contractors’ Risk Attitude on Competition in Construction. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(04), 275–83.
Laryea, S and Hughes, W (2011) Risk and Price in the Bidding Process of Contractors. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(04), 248–58.
Rivas, R A, Borcherding, J D, González, V and Alarcón, L F (2011) Analysis of factors influencing productivity using craftsmen questionnaires: Case study in a Chilean construction company. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(04), 312–20.
Taylor, J E, Dossick, C S and Garvin, M (2011) Meeting the Burden of Proof with Case-Study Research. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(04), 303–11.
Unsal, H I and Taylor, J E (2011) Modeling Interfirm Dependency: Game Theoretic Simulation to Examine the Holdup Problem in Project Networks. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(04), 284–93.
- Type: Journal Article
- Keywords: Simulation models; Theories; Innovation; Construction management; Contractors; Subcontractors; Game theory; Holdup problem; Innovation; Project networks; Simulation models;
- ISBN/ISSN: 0733-9364
- URL: https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000286
- Abstract:
Subcontractor selection strategies used by contractors can significantly affect short-term project and long-term organizational success. Existing research on subcontractor selection strategy implicitly assumes that the evaluation of subcontractors depends on current conditions. We extend this perspective by integrating an agent-based simulation model with game theory to examine whether precontract partner selection strategies that do not consider subcontractor selection as a repeated game may lead to a version of the holdup problem. The holdup problem we investigate focuses on relationship-specific investments in learning after the introduction of an innovation or organizational change across a project network. A minimum total cost strategy may decelerate the rate of adaptation to an innovation or organizational change, thereby proving that the holdup problem can exist in project networks. The findings contribute to subcontractor selection strategy literature by simulating the impact of the holdup problem in project networks, distinguishing task interdependence as a moderating variable, and identifying that the minimum total cost strategy can be a suboptimal strategy for project networks adapting to systemic changes.